Evidentiary propositions E 1 and E 2, each p-positively relevant to some hypothesis H, are mutually corroborating if p > p, i = 1, 2. Failures of such mutual corroboration are instances of what may be called the corroboration paradox. This paper assesses two rather different analyses of the corroboration paradox due, respectively, to John Pollock and Jonathan Cohen. Pollock invokes a particular embodiment of the principle of insufficient reason to argue that instances of the corroboration paradox are of negligible (...) probability, and that it is therefore defeasibly reasonable to assume that items of evidence positively relevant to some hypothesis are mutually corroborating. Taking a different approach, Cohen seeks to identify supplementary conditions that are sufficient to ensure that such items of evidence will be mutually corroborating, and claims to have identified conditions which account for most cases of mutual corroboration. Combining a proposed common framework for the general study of paradoxes of positive relevance with a simulation experiment, we conclude that neither Pollock’s nor Cohen’s claims stand up to detailed scrutiny. I am quite prepared to be told…”oh, that is an extreme case: it could never really happen!” Now I have observed that this answer is always given instantly, with perfect confidence, and without any examination of the proposed case. It must therefore rest on some general principle: the mental process being something like this—“I have formed a theory. This case contradicts my theory. Therefore, this is an extreme case, and would never occur in practice.”Rev. Charles L. Dodgson. (shrink)

This paper examines the way Charles Darwin applied his domestic breeding analogy to the practical workings of species evolution: that application, it is argued, centered on Darwin's distinction between methodical and unconscious selection. Methodical selection, which entailed pairing particular individuals for mating purposes, represented conditions of strict geographic isolation, obviously useful for species multiplication (speciation). By contrast, unconscious selection represented an open landmass with a large breeding population. Yet Darwin held that this latter scenario, which often would include multiple (...) ecological subdistricts and thus partial isolation, was better suited for speciation than were isolated conditions. At the same time, many passages in Darwin's writings that apparently portrayed phyletic evolution exclusively (these including references to unconscious selection), actually applied to speciation as well, for phyletic change in a single district could constitute a local manifestation of a larger common-descent pattern. This generic use of "phyletic" change was reflected in Darwin's deployment of the unconscious selection analogy in his published writings as well as in his dispute with Moritz Wagner over the necessity of geographic isolation for speciation. We can thus understand Darwin's otherwise puzzling declaration in The Origin of Species that unconscious selection was 'more important' than the methodical approach. (shrink)

The present age is sometimes called the Scientific Age. This does not imply that every member of the community is an expert scientist—far from it. It does mean, however, that the labours of the scientists have given the age certain features which influence the life of every citizen to some degree. Accordingly it is desirable that as many as possible should have some understanding of the scientists' work, of their aims, their point of view, and their methods. If we had (...) a wishing-rug or some sort of spare-time car that could transport us at will to any place and time, we might visit the scientists of every age, see them at work, listen to their discussions, and even take a hand in the proceedings. The wishing-rug is not available but the literature of science will serve the purpose for anyone who will do the necessary searching, reading, and thinking. Unfortunately, some of that literature is decidedly inaccessible. To meet the difficulty this book has been written in the hope of bringing some of the most important passages of the literature of science within the reach of everyone. Every past of the vast edifice of science is necessarily the work of some human being, and most of us become more interested in the building, and are able to understand and appreciate it better when we know who were the architects and builders and when, how, and why they did their work. The story of science is a noble epic of the struggle of man from ignorance toward knowledge and wisdom and toward the mastery of nature and of himself. One purpose of science is to systematize experience, and a knowledge of the story of science has helped many in that process of organization. This book, therefore, offers the reader a cordial invitation to embark on a tour of visits with great scientists to learn from them the parts they played in the advancement of science and of the human race. Here is a treasure-house of fascinating information for all who are interested in the world around us, and the history of man's understanding of it. (shrink)

The twelve contributors to Looking for Los Angeles focus on dramatic shifts in the urban landscape, important moments in the city's architectural history, and the role of the image in this mecca of image makers.

We show that the implicational fragment of intuitionism is the weakest logic with a non-trivial probabilistic semantics which satisfies the thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. We also show that several logics between intuitionism and classical logic also admit non-trivial probability functions which satisfy that thesis. On the other hand, we also prove that very weak assumptions concerning negation added to the core probability conditions with the restriction that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities are sufficient to (...) trivialize the semantics. (shrink)

Conclusions reached using common sense reasoning from a set of premises are often subsequently revised when additional premises are added. Because we do not always accept previous conclusions in light of subsequent information, common sense reasoning is said to be nonmonotonic. But in the standard formal systems usually studied by logicians, if a conclusion follows from a set of premises, that same conclusion still follows no matter how the premise set is augmented; that is, the consequence relations of standard logics (...) are monotonic. Much recent research in AI has been devoted to the attempt to develop nonmonotonic logics. After some motivational material, we give four formal proofs that there can be no nonmonotonic consequence relation that is characterized by universal constraints on rational belief structures. In other words, a nonmonotonic consequence relation that corresponds to universal principles of rational belief is impossible. We show that the nonmonotonicity of common sense reasoning is a function of the way we use logic, not a function of the logic we use. We give several examples of how nonmonotonic reasoning systems may be based on monotonic logics. (shrink)

In [2] Hempel and Oppenheim give a definition of “explanation” for a certain formal language. In [1] Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague prove five theorems demonstrating that the Hempel and Oppenheim definition is not restrictive enough. In [3] Kim proposes two further conditions to supplement the Hempel and Oppenheim definition in order to avoid the objections posed in [1]. In this paper it is shown that the definition of Hempel and Oppenheim supplemented by Kim's conditions is open to a trivialization very (...) analogous to that given in [1]. (shrink)

Nicht nur mit Engelszungen: Beiträge zur semitischen Dialektologie—Festschrift für Werner Arnold zum 60. Geburtstag. Edited by Renaud Kuty; Ulrich Seeger; and Shabo Talay. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2013. Pp. xx + 412. €118.

Erasmus’s Adages were among his most influential works in his own time, particularly later editions, which included both Greek and Latin. In the adages included in volumes 35 and 36, Erasmus criticizes secular and ecclesiastical life, commenting on topics such as war, reform of the church and spiritual life, and the corrupting effects of the relentless pursuit of wealth and power. Erasmus aims his narrative and commentary in Paraphrase on the Gospel of Matthew (volume 45) at a general educated audience (...) (rather than professional theologians). Together, these volumes provide readable and accurate edition of Erasmus’s work and helpful special indexes. (shrink)

The usual semantics for the modal systems T, S4, and S5 assumes that the set of possible worlds contains at least one member. Recently versions of these modal systems have been developed in which this assumption is dropped. The systems discussed here are obtained by slightly weakening the liberated versions of T and S4. The semantics does not assume the existence of possible worlds, and the accessibility relation between worlds is only required to be quasi-reflexive instead of reflexive. Completeness and (...) independence results are established. (shrink)

The intuitive notion behind the usual semantics of most systems of modal logic is that of ?possible worlds?. Loosely speaking, an expression is necessary if and only if it holds in all possible worlds; it is possible if and only if it holds in some possible world. Of course, contradictory expressions turn out to hold in no possible worlds, and logically true expressions turn out to hold in every possible world. A method is presented for transforming standard modal systems into (...) systems of modal logic for impossible worlds. To each possible world there corresponds an impossible world such that an expression holds in the impossible world if and only if it does not hold in the possible world. One can then talk about such worlds quite consistently, and there seems to be no logical reason for excluding them from consideration. (shrink)

This essay posits that Peirce puts the Normative Sciences implicitly to work at three junctures of his Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (NARG): (1) in the distinguishing of musement from play; (2) in the generation of the Humble Argument via musement; and (3) in the portrayal of the Humble Argument as the first stage of an inquiry into its confirmability. Then, focus shifts to Peirce’s notions of the initiating “play” and the “plausibility” of the God-hypothesis, as a means (...) both to analyze and underscore the foundational role of esthetics in the Normative Sciences. After a discussion of the theological content of the argument, the essay concludes that Peirce did indeed employ the Normative Sciences as postulated, but that his truncation of NARG at the abductive stage renders the overall argument inconclusive, amounting more to a report of a religio-esthetic experience. (shrink)

Neuaramäische Texte in den Dialekten der Khabur-Assyrer in Nordostsyrien. By Shabo Talay. Semitica Viva, vol. 41. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009. Pp. xv + 712. €148.

The business enterprise is a major instrument in the creation of a just society. However the tension between profit and ethicality requires sound decision making and business ethics instruction is central to creative alternatives to business leaders. Therefore, instruction is aided with a model for framing one’s thoughts about ethics and while several earlier business ethics models exist, they tend to be closed and at times parochial. This paper draws on insights from other academic disciplines to offer a broader yet (...) flexible framework for professors, students, scholars, and decision makers. At the center of the model is the four stage framework of Rest et al. as impacted by four sets of variables—individual, organizational, environmental, and issue. These are rooted in the work of Dunlop’s Industrial Relations Theory and Jones’ Moral Intensity. A literature review of important variables is presented and the paper concludes with several take aways for instruction and policy suggestions. (shrink)

Abstract The increasing prevalence of armed drones in the conduct of military operations has generated robust debate. Among legal scholars, the crux of the dispute generally pits those who herald the new technology's unparalleled precision against those who view such newfound capabilities as an inducement to employ excessive force. Largely overlooked in the discussion over how drone strikes can be accomplished lawfully is a more fundamental question: Can a model of warfare that eschews any risk of harm to one party (...) be squared with the ethical framework that informs the law of war? This matter has less to do with the technology per se than with a policy orientation that utilizes such technology as a strategy in itself, as opposed to one military tool in a larger arsenal. A corollary to the incongruity of riskless warfare is to query whether the ensuing breakdown of ethical and legal norms unwittingly encourages the very instability that the law of war attempts to control, thereby endangering the civilian populations of all parties to the conflict. While other authors have previously addressed the challenges posed by asymmetry to the law of armed conflict in different formats, this article explores these issues through a hypothetical scenario and seeks to elucidate some of the potential ramifications of the pursuit of physical impunity in war. (shrink)

Collingwood's attitude toward literary sources is related to the method of selective excavation. But as an excavator, Collingwood came in for some criticism from his fellow archaeologists. Collingwood's treatment of four historical problems is considered: why Caesar invaded Britain, why Augustus did not, how the Claudian conquest proceeded, and why Hadrian built his wall and vallum. Collingwood concluded that Caesar intended to conquer, Augustus did not, and that the vallum served a civil rather than military purpose. In trying to identify (...) past thought Collingwood approaches literary sources and archaeological remains with particular questions in mind. Questions and answers being correlative, this often amounts to having made up his mind in advance. When he comes to the evidence itself, he sees what he expects to see ; occasionally what he sees is not in fact there. Where Collingwood creates a history, Peter Salway sometimes seems to be summarizing a subject. With Collingwood, however, we more than participate in processes of thought, we actually see the connections. Collingwood makes the real rational, and no historian of Roman Britain has done that better. (shrink)